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To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone.
- Earl Warren1
When the government puts its imprimatur  on a particular re-
ligion, it conveys a message of exclusion to all those who do
not adhere to the favored beliefs. A government cannot be
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1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See  discussion infra  Part I.B.1.
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premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when
it asserts that God prefers some.
- Harry Blackmun2
A connection exists between the message one sees or hearsand the subjective experience one has in response.  A
movie can make us laugh or cry, a piece of music can immedi-
ately bring us back to some moment in time, painful or exulting,
a flag can make us feel patriotic, a few words can put us on top of
the world, or at the bottom.  Common experience confirms that
words, in particular, can evoke strong emotions.  In the realm of
religious experience, words can be used to transmit dogma, con-
duct sacred rituals and other elements of religious practice, or
foster group identity.  The impact of such words on individuals
and groups both inside and outside of a given religious order may
be powerful.  When the government uses religious words, the
message is just as provocative.  Depending on the circumstances,
it may be even more so.
In a recent constitutional challenge to the words “under God”
in the Pledge of Allegiance,3 Michael Newdow, on behalf of his
daughter, claimed that the daily recitation of the Pledge at the
public elementary schools of the Elk Grove Unified School Dis-
trict violates the Establishment Clause.4  The specific injury
claimed by Newdow is that his daughter is “compelled to ‘watch
and listen as her state-employed teacher in her state-run school
leads her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God,
and that our’s is ‘one nation under God.’”5  The U.S. Court of
2 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606-07 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See
discussion infra  Part II.
3 The original Pledge of Allegiance did not include the words “under God,” which
were added in 1954 by an act of Congress.  Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, Ch.
297, 68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4).
4 Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (Newdow I), re-
published at  328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom . Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
5 Newdow I , 292 F.3d at 601.  Ironically, the mother of Newdow’s child reports
that her daughter is a professed Christian and that she has no objection to reciting
the Pledge. See  Bob Egelko, Girl in Pledge Case Not an Atheist, Mom to Tell Court ,
S.F. CHRON. July 13, 2002, at A15.  Although her motion was ultimately denied, the
mother of Newdow’s daughter challenged Mr. Newdow’s standing to sue on the
ground that she maintains sole custody of their daughter. See  Newdow v. United
States Cong., 313 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2002).  In his opinion for the Supreme Court,
Justice Stevens noted the conflict between Newdow’s and his daughter’s reported
beliefs. Newdow , 124 S. Ct. at 2312.
In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Newdow, finding the
Pledge, including the words “under God” unconstitutional under
the Lemon , coercion, and endorsement tests set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court.6  The Ninth Circuit denied the Government’s re-
quests for an en banc rehearing and issued an amended decision
reaching essentially the same conclusion.7  The implementation
of the decision was stayed pending review by the U.S. Supreme
Court.8  On Flag Day, the Court released its much anticipated
decision.
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court emphasized the
significance of the Pledge as “a common public acknowledgment
of the ideals that [the] flag symbolizes.”9  Nonetheless, the Court
ultimately reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit on the
ground that Newdow lacked prudential standing.10  Chief Justice
Rehnquist authored an opinion concurring in the judgment but
found that Newdow had standing to challenge the Pledge.  Dis-
cussing the merits, Rehnquist opined that the Pledge does not
violate the Establishment Clause because the words “under
God” reflect the Nation’s religious history.11  Justice O’Connor
joined in Rehnquist’s conclusion, though she wrote separately to
emphasize why she maintains that the Pledge is not a state en-
dorsement of religion.12  Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
ment but stated that under current precedent, the Pledge could
dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the
person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.
Id .
6 Newdow I , 292 F.3d at 597.
7 Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (Newdow II), rev’d
sub. nom . Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).  In the
amended decision, the Ninth Circuit invalidated only the school district policy of
reciting the Pledge.  In its initial decision, the Ninth Circuit panel had struck down
the 1954 statute which amended the pledge to include the words “under God.”  That
ruling would have made every state or federal government application of the Pledge
unconstitutional.
8 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 384 (2003) (mem.).  The
Court identified the questions presented as “[w]hether a public school district policy
that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance,
which includes the words ‘under God,’ violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, as applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment,” and whether
Newdow had standing to challenge the school district policy. Id.
9 Newdow , 124 S. Ct. at 2305.
10 Id .
11 Id . at 2312 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
12 Id . at 2321 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see infra  Part II.A.1.
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not withstand an Establishment Clause challenge.13  Rather,
Thomas once again advanced his view that the Court’s incorpora-
tion of the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth
Amendment set the Court’s doctrine on an erroneous course.14
Justice Thomas concluded that even if the Establishment Clause
has been properly incorporated against the states, the Pledge
does not constitute a state establishment of religion.15  The ma-
jority opinion, supported by five Justices, does not reach the issue
of whether public school application of the Pledge violates the
Establishment Clause.16
In reflecting on Newdow , I recall a very special teacher telling
me about an earlier time in her life when she began her career
teaching elementary school children.  After she taught her stu-
dents to say the Pledge of Allegiance, they failed to notice when
she no longer repeated it with them.  As a young black woman in
the 1960s, she found it difficult to pledge allegiance to the flag,
not for lack of patriotism, but because her own life experiences
told her that American reality often did not live up to its lofty
ideals, at least some of which are reflected in the Pledge.17  It was
in part this reality that the Supreme Court confronted in Brown
v. Board of Education ,18 the landmark civil rights decision de-
claring segregation in education unconstitutional.
I also recall hearing some Christians occasionally express grief
over “the day that prayer was taken out of school,” no doubt
referring to Engel v. Vitale ,19 a Supreme Court case decided dur-
ing the same era as Brown .  Much like the cases invalidating
school-sponsored classroom prayer and Bible reading, the Ninth
Circuit decision in Newdow  excited passionate reactions.  But the
practice involved in Newdow  is far from the school-sponsored
classroom prayer and Bible reading involved in those cases.
13 Newdow , 124 S. Ct. at 2327 (Thomas, J., concurring) (applying Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992)); see  discussion infra  Part I.B.3.
14 Newdow , 124 S. Ct. at 2328; see also  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
677-80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
15 Newdow , 124 S. Ct. at 2333 (Thomas, J., concurring).
16 See id.  at 2305.  Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined in Ste-
vens’ opinion.  Justice Scalia recused himself from the case apparently due to public
comments he had previously made concerning the Ninth Circuit decision in
Newdow . See Charles Lane, High Court to Consider Pledge in Schools; Scalia
Recuses Himself from California Case , WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at A1.
17 Among other things, the Pledge characterizes America as “one Nation, under
God, with liberty and justice for all.”
18 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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While the principle that public schools cannot organize and facili-
tate religious practices such as prayer has long been recognized,
the Ninth Circuit decision was controversial because it strikes
two words from the Pledge based on the subjective experience of
listeners.20  Many unfamiliar with the Supreme Court’s Establish-
ment Clause doctrine would not have supposed that being re-
quired to listen to a phrase such as “under God” would amount
to a constitutional harm.  And those same persons, when posed
with the question of whether they believed the Pledge of Alle-
giance to be a religious exercise, would have probably answered
“no.”  Thus Michael Newdow’s claim can be seen as doubly
anomalous, resting on the feelings of a religious outsider when
required to passively listen to a marginally religious message.21
The lower court decision in Newdow  was not, however, as
some have suggested, merely a product of the “liberal” Ninth
Circuit.  Nor is the Ninth Circuit’s decision the judicial aberra-
tion from precedent that many claim it to be.22  Rather, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Newdow  reflects a trend within a particular
strand of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence that has become increasingly concerned with the religious
minority’s sense of inclusion in a given religious message.23  The
Court’s concern with eliminating the discomfort of nonadherents
began in the school prayer cases.  As the Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has developed, however, the Court has ap-
plied this approach in other factual settings.24
This trend reflects the Court’s reaction to what in some cases
has been and in other cases has appeared to be practices that
20 This Essay does not evaluate whether requiring teachers to lead willing students
in reciting the Pledge constitutes an affirmation of belief, religious or otherwise.  For
such a discussion of the Pledge, see Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and
the Limited State , 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2003).
21 For the purpose of this Essay, I assume that the Pledge, containing the words
“under God,” can be appropriately characterized as religious, without any qualifica-
tion as to whether its non-religious elements (political, historical, or traditional)
render it otherwise.
22 See  Steven G. Gey, “Under God,” The Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Consti-
tutional Trivia , 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865, 1869 n.13 (2003).  While collecting commen-
tary concluding that the Pledge including the words “under God” is constitutional,
Professor Gey takes the position that the current Pledge violates the Establishment
Clause.
23 Establishment Clause claims challenging aid to religious institutions, as well as
claims by religious groups seeking access to public facilities, are beyond the scope of
this Essay.
24 See infra  Part I.B.
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exclude persons with “religious minority” status.25  So in one
view, the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions could be char-
acterized as antidiscrimination cases that (together with Brown)
represent a cultural movement from a bad society to a better
one—from exclusion to inclusion.26  Yet others perceive the same
Establishment Clause decisions as secularizing and antireligious,
marking society’s movement from bad to worse.  It is difficult to
ascribe any particular motivation to one person, let alone, as in
the case of the Supreme Court, several different groups of people
over time.27  Nonetheless, in this Essay, I attempt to do so and I
conclude that it is probably fair to say that the Court’s intention
was to target discrimination, with incidental harm to religionists
occurring as a type of secondary effect.
The problem that eventually arose was, in part, one of degree.
Recognizing the reality of the impact of words and symbols on
non-adherents, the Court began invalidating religious manifesta-
tions on grounds scarcely more than religious offense.  In its jus-
25 As is often the case with labels, the terms “majority” and “minority” are diffi-
cult in this context.  Generally and historically, Protestant Christianity has been in
the religious majority and most other faiths as well as non-believers have been in the
minority.  These designations are subject to change as the analysis shifts from one
community to another.  Any attempt to characterize the religious majority and mi-
nority is also made difficult by considerations of the overall societal power structure.
While certain vocal members of the religious majority may wield power in their local
communities, they are probably in the minority in terms of their representation in
national government, the media, academia, and other outlets that exert considerable
control over the direction of society.
26 Cf.  Marci Hamilton, Holiday Decorations, Religion Clauses and the Supreme
Court , CNN.COM at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/01/findlaw.analysis.hamilton.
decorations/index.html (Jan. 1, 2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s religious
display cases progressively dispelled the idea of a “solely Christian world view”
much like the Court’s decision in Brown  responded to the discrimination fostered by
Jim Crow).  In a related discussion Hamilton asks, “[i]f a public school offers only
Christian holiday symbols, will non-Christian children feel fully included in the edu-
cation offered?” Id .; see also  Tseming Yang, Race, Religion and Cultural Identity:
Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion , 73 IND. L.J. 119, 180 (1997)
(“Endorsement jurisprudence evinces the constitutional importance of inclusion and
tests the permissibility of government programs and actions in this regard.”).
27 Several recent works have offered pragmatic explanations for the Court’s Es-
tablishment Clause decisions.  John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James A. Ryan, A Political
History of the Establishment Clause , 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001) (noting early
Establishment Clause decisions reflecting a strict separation of church and state in-
spired by Protestant bias against growing Catholic population); Stephen M. Feld-
man, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and
the Future , 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 238-51 (2003) (arguing that Jewish claimants
making Establishment Clause challenges to majoritarian practices succeeded to the
extent that members of the Court found Jewish interests consistent with the interests
of the Protestant majority).
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tifiable haste to safeguard minority interests, the Court has
produced a doctrine that is poised to displace all public religious
manifestations.28  The shifting constitutional tests used to evalu-
ate Establishment Clause cases reveal a diminishing quantum of
Establishment harm required to invalidate a particular policy, de-
volving to no more than mere exposure to a religious message.
In this Essay, I propose for consideration the following thought
and attendant questions: one’s evaluation of Newdow  depends
on which story one believes.  Does the Court’s Establishment
Clause doctrine, focusing on the inclusion of outsiders, amount
to a vindication of religious minorities?  Or does the doctrine
threaten to overbalance in favor of religious offense at the ex-
pense of the religious majority?
The Court is aware of the tension raised by these questions.
Members of the Court have, over the years, proposed a resolu-
tion in a category of constitutionally acceptable references to re-
ligion, sometimes referred to as ceremonial deism.  The theory of
ceremonial deism is essentially that certain common religious ref-
erences do not offend the Establishment Clause.  Taking seri-
ously ceremonial deism and repeated Court dicta about the
constitutionality of the Pledge, Judge Fernandez, dissenting from
the Ninth Circuit panel majority in Newdow I , viewed the case as
little more than one of political correctness run amuck:
[S]uch phrases as “In God We Trust” or “under God” have no
tendency to establish a religion in this country or to suppress
anyone’s exercise, or non-exercise, of religion, except in the
fevered eye of persons who most fervently would like to drive
all tincture of religion out of the public life of our polity.
Those expressions have not caused any real harm of that sort
. . . and are not likely to do so in the future.29
This conclusion necessarily implies a balancing of the will of
the majority against the concerns of the minority.  The invocation
of ceremonial deism in a given case represents—though not ex-
plicitly—the Court’s best attempt to answer the question of
which group’s interests should prevail.  But without more expla-
nation, it is difficult to discern why, as a doctrinal matter, these
28 Of course, some argue that this is precisely the purpose of the Establishment
Clause. See , e.g. , Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy , 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 195 (1992).
29 Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez,
J., dissenting) republished at  328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom.  Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
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cases ought to come out any differently than those not invoking
ceremonial deism.30
Nonetheless, on the issue raised in Newdow  I agree with Judge
Fernandez,31 but not without some deliberation about the con-
cept of inclusion as what appears to be the new Establishment
Clause marker. One will not find “inclusion,” as such, offered by
any member of the Court as an explicit constitutional test,32 but
woven into the fabric of much of the Supreme Court’s modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the idea that a good law,
practice, or policy is one that does not exclude.33  Commentators
30 See generally  Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism , 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1996) (finding most instances of ceremonial deism
unconstitutional under the endorsement test); see also  Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking
Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Un-
tapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight , 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986) (arguing
that a fair application of the endorsement test would render unconstitutional the
words “under God” in the Pledge, as well as the Supreme Court’s practice of open-
ing its sessions with the invocation, “God Save This Honorable Court”).
31 Although the de minimis approach is appealing, I reach this conclusion not by
merely asserting that the phrase “under God” is trivial.  As discussed infra , triviality
is a matter of perspective.  As some have observed, if the words “under God” were
trivial or unimportant, the effort to remove them would not be met with such intense
resistance. See generally  Gey, supra  note 22; cf.  Sullivan, supra  note 28, at 207 n.59
(1992) (“[W]e need not melt down the national currency to get rid of ‘In God We
Trust.’  Rote recitation of God’s name is easily distinguished as a de minimis en-
dorsement in comparison with prayer or the seasonal invocation of sacred symbols.
The pledge of allegiance is a closer question.”).
32 Interestingly, at oral argument Justice Breyer pressed Michael Newdow about
whether the Pledge was inclusive of many religious faiths:
Question: I mean, it’s pretty, it’s a pretty broad use of religion sometimes.
I—does it make you feel any better, and I think the answer’s going to be
no, but there is a case called Seeger , which referred to the Constitution—to
the statute that used the word, supreme being, and it said that those words,
supreme being, included a set of beliefs, sincere beliefs, which in any ordi-
nary person’s life fills the same place as a belief in God fills in the life of an
orthodox religionist.  So it’s reaching out to be inclusive, maybe to include
you, I mean, to—because many people who are not religious nonetheless
have a set of beliefs which occupy the same place that religious beliefs oc-
cupy in the mind and woman of a religious—of a religious mind in men and
women.
So do you think God is so generic in this context that it could be that
inclusive?
See  Transcript of Oral Argument at *34-35, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (No. 02-1624), 2004 WL 736416; see also Excerpts
From Arguments on the Meaning of ‘Under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance , N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at A22 (attributing the question to Justice Breyer).
33 Webster’s defines “inclusion” as “[a] relation between two classes that exists
when all members of the first are also members of the second.” WEBSTER’S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 609 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 1988).  In this
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also have accepted this idea as an appropriate measure of the
Establishment Clause.34  Since by definition most traditional reli-
gions have characteristics of doctrinal, organizational, and/or so-
cial exclusivity, it follows that almost any public religious
manifestation can be said to exclude non-adherents.35  The likeli-
hood of reaching this conclusion is increased considerably when
one evaluates, as proof of exclusion, the presumed psychological
impact on outsiders. Newdow  is significant because the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to avoid ceremonial deism in favor of inclusion
puts pressure on current doctrine.  In reversing on standing
rather than reaching the merits, the Supreme Court has tempora-
rily avoided confrontation with the inconsistencies in its Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine.  For the reasons discussed in this
Essay, however, the concept of inclusion reflects a larger trend
that will ultimately eclipse the issue of the Pledge, regardless of
whether and when it finds its way back to the Supreme Court.
This Essay evaluates the development, scope, and impact of
the concept of inclusion. Unlike most contemporary commen-
tary, however, this Essay questions whether the concept of inclu-
sion as an element of Establishment Clause doctrine benefits
society as a whole, which, of course, consists of religious majori-
ties and minorities.
Part I of this Essay traces the development of a concept of
inclusion in the Court’s Establishment Clause cases.  The Essay
attempts to contextualize the Court’s Establishment Clause deci-
sions by comparing concerns in cases such as the early school
prayer cases with similar concerns in the quintessential antidis-
crimination case, Brown v. Board of Education .  Part II high-
lights the inconsistency between ceremonial deism and the
Essay I use the term inclusion to refer to the idea that the Establishment Clause
should be interpreted to craft a society that is inclusive of everyone.
34 See  Loewy, supra  note 30, at 1069 (interpreting the endorsement test as one
that prohibits government from placing a “badge of inferiority” on religious minori-
ties); see also  Epstein, supra  note 30; Kenneth L. Karst, The State of Civil Liberties:
Where Do We Go From Here , 27 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992).  One com-
mentator has even advocated a positive right of inclusion. See  Alan E. Garfield, A
Positive Rights Interpretation of the Establishment Clause , 76 TEMP. L. REV. 281,
282-83 (2003) (“I suggest that, even if a governmental action is not demonstrably
harmful to church/state relations, it can still be unconstitutional if it does not help
further the Establishment Clause’s larger goal of creating an inclusive society that
welcomes all members . . . .”).
35 Many non-traditional religions, by contrast, do not fit neatly into a conception
of exclusivity. See, e.g. , http://www.scientology.org (describing as a maxim of the
religion that “only those things that one finds for himself are true”).
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Court’s inclusion approach, and argues that the category of cere-
monial deism has not been adequately explained in light of its
striking conflict with existing precedent.  Part II further argues
that the Court must squarely confront the balance implicit in its
doctrine, between the interests of religious minorities in being
free from exclusion or offense and the interests of religious ma-
jorities in maintaining certain practices.  Part II attempts to as-
sess the relative claims of majorities and minorities by asking
whether an Establishment Clause theory of inclusion achieves its
goal of creating a better, more inclusive society.  After discussing
the two harms the concept of inclusion is presumably aimed at
redressing—persecution and psychic injury—Part II concludes
that while the idea of an inclusive society is a desirable one, the
Court’s doctrine does not necessarily achieve that effect.  Finally,
Part III argues that the practical application of inclusion as a doc-
trine tends to leave behind the related concept of tolerance upon
which inclusion appears to be grounded.
I
THE PATH TO INCLUSION
A. Rhetorical Inclusion
It is no secret that the U.S. Supreme Court does not have a
sterling historical record of combating insensitivity—religious,
racial, or otherwise.36  If one follows the course of the Court’s
precedent in the area of religion, however, a pattern of increasing
awareness of religions other than Protestant Christianity and of
the nonreligious slowly appears.
In Davis v. Beason ,37 the Court upheld an Idaho law that re-
quired citizens, before they could register to vote, to take an oath
that they were not members of any group that taught polygamy,
and that they did not publicly or privately advocate polygamy.38
The Court rejected the petitioners’ Establishment Clause chal-
36 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (denying an Equal Protection challenge
to a Virginia law requiring sterilization of mentally handicapped women).  “It is bet-
ter for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime,
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are mani-
festly unfit from continuing their kind . . . .  Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.” Id . See generally  Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming forced detention of Japanese-Ameri-
cans living in the United States).
37 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
38 Id.  at 333.
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lenge, though the law’s apparent aim was to prevent Mormons
from voting or otherwise holding office.  Downplaying the as-
pects of the law that purported to regulate belief and association,
the Court reasoned that the Idaho law covered only conduct that
could be criminally prohibited notwithstanding any conflict with
religious doctrine.39
And in Holy Trinity Church v. United States ,40 a religious cor-
poration was convicted under a federal statute which forbade
paying for foreign persons to immigrate into the United States.
Interpreting the statute, the Court reasoned that even if Holy
Trinity’s conduct were covered by the language of the prohibi-
tion, Congress did not intend the statute to restrict the immigra-
tion of “ministers of the gospel.”41  In defending its holding, the
Court noted at length the history of religious references in vari-
ous state laws and constitutions, as well as in the federal Consti-
tution and the Declaration of Independence.42  Recognizing
these religious references along with previous judicial observa-
tions, the Court declared the United States to be a “Christian
nation.”43  In so doing, the Court made seemingly approving ref-
erences to Roman Catholicism and Judaism, while quoting a
lower court decision denigrating Islam and other faiths as
imposters.44
In later Establishment Clause cases, the Court began to recog-
nize all religious faiths, as well as nonreligion.  In Everson v.
Board of Education ,45 a case challenging public funds used to
reimburse parents for money spent on bus transportation for
children attending parochial schools, the Court made clear that
the scope of protection under the religion clauses extends to
those who profess no religion at all.  The Court recounted the
history of religious divisiveness and persecution in England and
in the early colonies, concluding that the Establishment Clause
erects a “wall of separation between Church and State” that
would forbid the use of public funds to support religious institu-
tions.46  In upholding the program, the Court reasoned that the
39 Id.  at 347-48.
40 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
41 Id.  at 463.
42 Id.  at 465-70.
43 Id.  at 471.
44 Id.  at 470-72.
45 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
46 Id . at 16.
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Free Exercise Clause would likewise not permit states to exclude
from the benefits of public welfare legislation “Catholics, Luther-
ans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of
their faith, or lack of it.”47
In Zorach v. Clauson ,48 the Supreme Court upheld an off-cam-
pus release time program against an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge, stating on behalf of all Americans that “[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing.”49  Though today this statement sounds controversial when
juxtaposed with other Supreme Court decisions from the same
modern period, it represented a serious move away from explicit
references to the God of Christianity and Judaism.  The Court
further explained,
We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as
the spiritual needs of man deem necessary.  We sponsor an
attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to
any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.50
While Everson  and Zorach  marked the transition from rhetor-
ical exclusion to inclusion, the development of inclusion as an
element of Establishment Clause doctrine was gradually
unfolding.
B. Inclusion as a Paradigm
1. Vulnerability of the Young — “Hearts and Minds”
In McCollum v. Board of Education ,51 the Supreme Court
struck an Illinois release time program which provided religious
instruction on public school grounds during the school day.52  In
finding a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court relied
on the principle of strict “separation of Church and State,”53 ar-
ticulated in the previous term in Everson .  Justice Frankfurter’s
concurring opinion signaled a hint in the direction of inclusion as
an aspect of separation.  Frankfurter discussed the danger of fus-
47 Id .
48 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
49 Id.  at 313.
50 Id .
51 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
52 Students who had their parents’ permission were allowed to leave their secular
class to attend a religion class on a weekly basis. Id.  at 206.
53 Id.  at 211-12.
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ing the functions of religious and secular education, and elabo-
rated on what he perceived to be the impact on children whose
religious sects were not represented among the religious
teachers:
The children belonging to these non-participating sects will
thus have inculcated in them a feeling of separatism when the
school should be the training ground for habits of community,
or they will have religious instruction in a faith which is not
that of their parents.  As a result, the public school system of
Champaign actively furthers inculcation in the religious tenets
of some faiths, and in the process sharpens the consciousness
of religious differences at least among some of the children
committed to its care.54
Though not a part of the majority opinion, Justice Frank-
furter’s language marked an incremental step in the shift toward
a focus on the feelings of an excluded group.55
In its first school prayer decision, Engel v. Vitale ,56 the Court
invalidated a school board’s policy directing voluntary recitation
of a non-sectarian prayer at the beginning of each school day.57
The Court found a violation of the Establishment Clause without
any specific showing of coercion, noting the “indirect coercive
pressure” leveled against religious minorities to conform to the
majority faith.58  In Abington School District v. Schempp ,59 the
Court invalidated school policies requiring daily Bible reading
54 Id.  at 227-28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
55 Cf. , e.g. , Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause , 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 684-86 (2002) (recognizing Frankfurter’s
opinion in McCollum  as a precursor to the adoption of a political equality theory of
the Establishment Clause).
56 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
57 The prayer consisted of the following sentence: “‘Almighty God, we acknowl-
edge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents,
our teachers and our Country.’” Id.  at 422.  In Engel , the Court was careful to
insure that its school prayer ruling could not be construed to invalidate practices like
the Pledge:
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged  to
express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the
Declaration of Independence which contains references to the Deity or by
singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer’s profes-
sion of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many mani-
festations in our public life of belief in God.
Id.  at 435 n.21.
58 Id.  at 431.
59 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.60  Although students could
be excused from the Bible reading and prayer, the daily exercises
were curricular activities supervised by teachers as a part of com-
pulsory public education.  Thus, the Court found that the prac-
tices violated the Establishment Clause.61
Though sometimes referencing the history of the early colo-
nies, the Court likely found its approach desirable in light of
more contemporary controversies. The civil rights struggles of
the day amply demonstrated that unchecked majority rule could
mean domination and oppression.62  Against this background, it
is no wonder that the Warren Court that decided Brown v. Board
of Education  would make quick strides toward condemning prac-
tices that smacked of religious domination.63  To make matters
worse, many of the areas viewed as bastions for school prayer
and other majoritarian religious manifestations were the very
same places  that bitterly fought to hold onto Jim Crow.64
60 The Pledge of Allegiance was also part of the daily exercise. Id.  at 208.
61 Id.  at 223.
62 This is one explanation.  Professor Klarman has argued, for example, that the
Court’s post-World War II Establishment Clause jurisprudence developed, in part,
as a reaction to the atrocities committed against the Jews at the hands of the Nazis.
See, e.g. , Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolu-
tions , 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1996).  He also opines that the rise of separationism
reflected in the Court’s doctrine was facilitated in part by the demise of fervent anti-
communism. Id.  at 61.
63 Noah Feldman has noted the commentators making the connection between
Brown  and the Court’s post-war Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See  Feldman,
supra  note 55, at 702-03; see also, e.g. , Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern
Church-State Relations , 43 B.C. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2002); William P. Marshall, “We
Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court Establishment , 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
495, 531 n.214 (1986) (speculating that Brown  was the “true spiritual guide” of the
school prayer cases).
64 See  Berg, supra  note 63, at 1015.  The State of Arkansas defended against an
Establishment Clause challenge to its “anti-evolution statute,” which criminalized
the teaching of evolution in public schools. See , e.g. , Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968).  The petitioner challenging the law was a teacher at Little Rock Cen-
tral High School, the same school where the state’s National Guard had been
deployed to prevent the admission of the “Little Rock Nine” ten years earlier. See
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  In recent times, the Eleventh Circuit has com-
pared Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore, who refused to remove a Ten
Commandments monument from the rotunda of the state judicial building, to for-
mer Mississippi Governor Ross Barnette, who attempted to block the integration of
the University of Mississippi in 1962, and to former Alabama Governor George
Wallace, who in 1965 interfered with and failed to provide police protection to a civil
rights march from Selma to Montgomery. See, e.g. , Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d
1282, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2003); see also ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF
EARL WARREN 387-88 (1997); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN
AND HIS SUPREME COURT 442 (1983) (noting that those who opposed Brown  also
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The weapon that the Court used in Brown  to invalidate the
separate but equal doctrine was its focus on the psychological
impact of segregation on black school children.  In his opinion,
Chief Justice Warren framed the Equal Protection violation in
terms of the negative impact on the “hearts and minds” of
blacks.65  As counsel for petitioners, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund (LDF) had argued the sociological point in the lower court
and in related segregation cases.  Thurgood Marshall, then lead
LDF counsel, decided to rely heavily on sociological research to
condemn segregation in education.66  The decision in Brown , in-
troducing its “hearts and minds” language and referencing socio-
logical research in its famed footnote 11, canonized this
compelling appeal to personal experience. Brown ’s focus on the
feelings of the excluded group arguably foreshadowed the even-
tual use of similar criteria in the area of religion.67  And even as
many of the horribles of the Jim Crow era were slowly moving
into the past, new reasons for the Court to fear majoritarian con-
trol seemed to emerge.  The robust development of the Religious
Right in the seventies and eighties, for example, no doubt raised
concern for at least some members of the Court that perhaps lo-
cal governments could be dominated by a single, powerful relig-
ious majority.68
opposed the Court’s school prayer cases).  In a bizarre forecast of things to come, a
group picketing the White House to protest the Warren Court’s school prayer deci-
sions carried signs bearing various messages including “The Flag is Next.” Id.  at
391.
65 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
66 See JAMES T. PATTERSON, Brown v. Board of Education : A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 42-45 (2001); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 158-62
(1987).
67 Compare  William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment
and Free Exercise Jurisprudence , 66 IND. L.J. 351, 363-66 (1991) (classifying the
claim in Brown  as one of “stigma” not present in claims of religious offense), and
Feldman, supra  note 55, at 704-05 (noting that the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and the endorsement test in particular focus on political exclusion and
not merely individual feelings of exclusion), with  Kenneth L. Karst, The First
Amendment, The Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government , 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (1992) (noting that religious minorities suffer a “pain-
ful status harm”), and  Epstein, supra  note 30, passim  (characterizing the endorse-
ment test as one that asks whether an individual is made to feel like a religious
outsider in her own country).
68 See, e.g. , FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES & DISSENTERS 7 (1999).
Society is becoming increasingly pluralistic, but at the same time the coun-
try is witnessing the immense growth in power of the Christian Coalition
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2. Non-Endorsement and the Outsider
As the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence developed
in other areas, the concept of inclusion and the perspective of the
outsider became paramount.  In Lynch v. Donnelly ,69 a case in-
volving a public cre`che display, Justice O’Connor in a concurring
opinion advanced her endorsement test which inquires whether a
particular government-sponsored activity “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the po-
litical community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
nity.”70  The majority upheld the display, reasoning that national
observation of the Christmas holiday did no more than recognize
the country’s religious heritage.71  O’Connor agreed that the
cre`che display did not violate the Establishment Clause because,
in her view, the citizens of the town would not understand the
cre`che to indicate an endorsement of Christianity.72  In a later
case, County of Allegheny v. ACLU ,73 the Court adopted the en-
dorsement test but found the county’s cre`che display unconstitu-
tional.74  The Court distinguished Lynch , reasoning that the
cre`che in that case was surrounded by other items that would
detract from its religious meaning, thus diffusing the message and
any possibility of endorsement.75
and other evangelical organizations with similar agendas.  In addition, large
numbers of citizens identify themselves as ‘born again.’  Much of this group
sees increasing religious . . . pluralism as a threat to its values and beliefs.
This powerful segment of society actively seeks to use the mechanisms of
government, and particularly the public schools, to back its beliefs and po-
litical views.
Id .
Even before official recognition of a developing “Religious Right,” a considerable
Protestant majority existed in the United States. See, e.g. , Michael DeHaveson
Newsom, Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire , 11 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 219, 306-07 (2002).  Steven Gey suggests that the national reac-
tion to Newdow  in defense of the current Pledge is evidence of the religious major-
ity’s attempt to “subtly underscore its continuing dominance.” STEVEN G. GEY,
RELIGION AND THE STATE 9 (Supp. 2002).
69 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
70 Id.  at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Under O’Connor’s formulation, disap-
proval sends the opposite message, and is likewise unconstitutional.
71 Id.  at 685-86.
72 Id.  at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
73 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
74 Id.
75 Id.  at 598-601.  Particularly relevant was the fact that the cre`che display in Alle-
gheny  contained the words, “Glory to God in the Highest.” Id.
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Although Justice O’Connor introduced the endorsement test
as a modification of the oft-criticized Lemon  test used in Estab-
lishment Clause cases,76 the endorsement inquiry clearly shifts
the focus from the actor to the audience. Lemon  asks whether a
local government has acted with a religious purpose, and whether
that action has a primary effect that either advances or inhibits
religion.77  With endorsement, the question becomes whether a
“reasonable observer” would interpret the government’s action
as a message communicating outsider status.78  Though the Court
has sometimes protested to the contrary,79 its Establishment
Clause doctrine places a great deal of importance on the feelings
of perceived outgroups.  Thus, notwithstanding the Court’s deci-
sions in Lynch  and Allegheny , many equate endorsement with
the presence of any religious symbol in government, regardless of
size, scale or context.80
76 See Lynch , 465 U.S. at 688-89 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
77 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
78 The reasonable observer is presumed to be familiar with the history of the stat-
ute or practice in question. See  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  The precise religious identity of the observer is an un-
known. See Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 620 (“[A]n adjudication of the display’s effect
must take into account the perspective of one who is neither Christian nor Jewish, as
well as of those who adhere to either of these religions . . . .”); see also  discussion
infra  note 150.
79 See, e.g. , Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (“We do not hold that every
state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.
People may take offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages,
but offense alone does not in every case show a violation.”); discussion infra  Part
I.B.3.  Indeed, the Court’s statement itself suggests that in at least some cases, of-
fense alone shows a violation.
80 Controversies over municipal seals and logos amply demonstrate this point.
Recently, in a 3-2 decision, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors voted to
remove a small cross from its county seal. See  County of Los Angeles, County of
Los Angeles Official Seal, at  http://lacounty.info/seal.htm (last visited July 10, 2004).
The seal is divided into approximately seven symbols, one of which depicts a small
cross. See id .  The cross shares its segment of the seal with two small stars and is
suspended above a rendering of the Hollywood Bowl.  Ironically, the largest image
in the entire seal is the pagan goddess Pomona holding an armful of fruit, pictured in
the middle of the seal and appearing at least ten times larger than the cross and
several times larger than the other symbols pictured—a tuna, a cow, oil derricks, a
Spanish galleon, and engineering instruments.  Under a straightforward reading of
Lynch  and Allegheny  which together rely on scale and context, the Los Angeles
County seal should easily pass the endorsement test.  Nonetheless, the executive
director of the ACLU’s Southern California chapter was quoted as explaining the
proposed legal challenge to the seal as an issue of inclusion: “We realize that this is
not the most important civil liberties issue in our society . . . [b]ut it does make some
people feel unwelcome.  And we feel the county seal should be welcoming.” See id .
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3. School Prayer Revisited
A pivotal school prayer decision, Lee v. Weisman ,81 went fur-
ther than the Court’s earlier school prayer cases, paving the way
for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow .  In Lee,  the Supreme
Court considered a parent’s challenge to a public school superin-
tendent’s longstanding policy of inviting members of the clergy to
deliver invocations and benedictions at middle and high school
graduations.  At Weisman’s middle school graduation, a rabbi de-
livered the invocation and benediction pursuant to the school’s
guidelines, which contained an admonition to compose nonsec-
tarian prayers with “‘inclusiveness and sensitivity.’”82
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found that the grad-
uation prayers were coercive toward students who did not desire
to participate.83  Kennedy’s opinion in Lee  marked the Court’s
first use of the coercion test in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, though the version of coercion he advanced was arguably
different than what some would have expected.84  Although no
one was required to pray or even stand during the approximately
ninety seconds of total prayer time, the public exercise, according
to the Court, placed indirect peer pressure on dissenting students
to stand and be silent rather than remain seated and risk social
disapproval.85  Since standing would appear to be participating,
the prayer placed students in the untenable position of having to
choose between personal conscience and popularity.86  In lan-
guage reminiscent of Brown , Justice Kennedy proffered research
in sociology and psychology to support the Court’s assertion that
adolescents are particularly susceptible to peer pressure to con-
form to social norms.87  Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, couched
81 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
82 Id.  at 581.  The quoted phrase comes from a pamphlet adopted by school offi-
cials and distributed to clergy to aid in preparation of the invocation and benedic-
tion.  The pamphlet, entitled, “Guidelines for Civic Occasions,” was prepared by the
National Conference of Christians and Jews. Id.
83 Id.  at 586.
84 See, e.g. , id . at 640-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see  Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads , 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 158-59 (1992) (arguing,
before the decision in Lee  was issued, that a realistic application of coercion would
result in the specific prayer in Lee  being found unconstitutional).
85 Lee , 505 U.S. at 593.
86 Id.
87 Id.  This argument had been advanced by Justice Frankfurter with respect to
the release time program at issue in McCollum , though without any attempt at ob-
jective support for the proposition.  McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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in terms of avoiding civil strife between competing religious fac-
tions, clearly echoed concerns about the exclusion of outsiders.88
Yet the Court’s finding of coercion in Lee  was a serious depar-
ture from the Court’s earlier school prayer cases.  It is significant
that Engel  involved a long-standing practice of nonsectarian
Christian prayer and Schempp  involved both prayer and Bible
reading in a classroom setting.  Such school-sponsored religious
exercises occurred on a daily basis, and thus the students likely
feared that dissent would attract the disapproval of not only
peers, but teachers and perhaps other school officials.  The “indi-
rect coercive pressure” included the possibility that teachers or
school officials could single out and punish dissenting students
for failure to participate in religious observances.  In Lee , the
Court recognized peer pressure alone as a cognizable Establish-
ment Clause harm.
And in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe ,89 a later
case involving a student-led prayer policy for high school football
games, the Court’s focus shifted from peer pressure to confronta-
tion with “personally offensive religious rituals.”90 Santa Fe  in-
volved a school policy that permitted students to vote first on
whether there would be an “invocation,” “message,” or “state-
ment” as a part of the pre-game ceremonies for a given football
season.91  If the students voted in favor of a pre-game message,
they were to then elect a particular student both to deliver the
message and to determine what message to deliver.92  Con-
That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not
eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to con-
science and outside the school’s domain.  The law of imitation operates,
and nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children.  The
result is an obvious pressure upon children to attend.
Id .  In his concurrence in Abington , Justice Brennan later quoted Frankfurter’s
statement, citing research in social psychology.  Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 291-92 & n.69 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
88 Lee , 505 U.S. at 599-609 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoted at the beginning of
this Essay).  Though included in a footnote as support for the assertion that govern-
ment endorsement of religion escalates civil strife, a rare quote from Sigmund Freud
can better be explained for the proposition that religions engender feelings of exclu-
sion: “Sigmund Freud expressed it this way: ‘a religion, even if it calls itself the relig-
ion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it.’” Id.  at 607
n.10 (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE
EGO 51 (James Strachey trans. 1922)).
89 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
90 Id.  at 312.
91 Id.  at 297-98.
92 Id.
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fronted with the potential for prayer facilitated by a majoritarian
policy, the Court presumed harm to religious minorities given the
small likelihood that a minority candidate would prevail in the
election.93  The Court noted that the policy at issue, previously
titled “Prayer at Football Games,” invited religious messages be-
cause of, among other things, its stated purpose of “solemniz[ing]
the event.”94  Critical in both Lee  and Santa Fe  is the fact that
the religious message was actually delivered or proposed to be
delivered by persons other than school officials, and that any re-
sulting exclusion was at the hands of students, though arguably
facilitated by the existence of the message.
The Court’s decisions make clear that, for however long this
interpretation is accepted by a majority of the Court, the Estab-
lishment Clause is largely about protecting the feelings of the
nonadherent from a public manifestation that may confer out-
sider status.
II
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
While most Establishment Clause theory has attempted to
demonstrate some nexus or lack of nexus between current doc-
trine and original intent, in this critique I do not attempt to do so.
There may be good reasons for following an originalist approach,
but it is not likely to be responsive to the concerns that underlie
the concept of inclusion.95  Rather, the interesting question (that
few, if any, have asked) is this—does inclusion work?  At a mini-
93 Id.  at 304 (“[T]his student election does nothing to protect minority views but
rather places the students who hold such views at the mercy of the majority.”).
94 Id.  at 306.  The Court also mentioned the existence of evidence of proselytizing
by students and school officials. Id.  at 295.
95 This is not an attempt to avoid the doctrinal implications of an inquiry into
original intent.  An originalist approach would probably support inclusion of the
words “under God” in the Pledge as well as many other instances of ceremonial
deism, though the Court’s precedent has shown that Establishment Clause history in
particular can be quite malleable.  I avoid the debate simply because the respective
approaches of originalism and inclusion typically have nothing to say to each other.
Compare  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 671 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“It requires little imagination to conclude that [presidential
Thanksgiving Proclamations] would cause nonadherents to feel excluded, yet they
have been a part of our national heritage from the beginning.”), with  Epstein, supra
note 30, at 2155-56 (“I readily concede that arguments advanced above [asserting
the unconstitutionality of ceremonial deism] fly in the face of the original intent of
the Framers of the First Amendment . . . .  The key question is not what the Consti-
tution meant in 1789 or 1791, but what it should mean today.”).
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mum, a good legal theory should accomplish what it claims to be
able to do.  If a theory of the Establishment Clause is supposed
to safeguard minorities and create a more tolerant and hence,
better society, we should at least ask whether it actually does
that.
A. Majorities and Minorities in Context96
1. Ceremonial Deism as a Majoritarian Bulwark
The precise issue raised in Newdow—whether recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in public school is constitutional—has been
asked and answered by the Supreme Court, at least in dicta.  The
Pledge controversy began with West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette ,97 in which the Supreme Court held that elementary
school students may not be compelled to recite the Pledge.98  The
plaintiffs in Barnette  objected out of a religious duty, but the
Court emphasized that the First Amendment freedom from com-
pelled orthodoxy does not depend on whether one’s objection is
religious.99  This was before the words “under God” were even a
part of the Pledge.  The assumption underlying Barnette  is that
silent dissent and excusal without punishment, the remedy
sought by the plaintiffs in that case, was a sufficient means to
protect their First Amendment interests.  In terms of the Court’s
Establishment Clause doctrine, Lee ’s emphasis on psychological
pressure, combined with Barnette ’s recognition of the more gen-
eral right to be free from compelled orthodoxy, would seem to
suggest quite logically that the organized, teacher-led recitation
of the Pledge is unconstitutional, even if an opt-out alternative is
provided.100  Justice Thomas took this view in his concurrence in
Newdow , though Chief Justice Rehnquist defended the distinc-
96 This discussion focuses on the treatment of minorities and majorities under a
particular line of Establishment Clause cases not including equal access and aid,
which in recent years have been particularly accommodating to religious majorities.
See, e.g. , Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News Club v.
Milford, 533 U.S. 93 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995).  As discussed infra  Part II.A.2., recent Free Exercise Clause
doctrine has been far less charitable to the cause of religious minorities. See, e.g. ,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
97 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
98 Id . (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
99 Barnette , 319 U.S. at 642.
100 For a discussion of the constitutionality of the Pledge in light of Lee v. Wise-
man , see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem , 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 451 (1995).
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tion between Barnette  and Lee , referring to the former as “com-
pulsion” and the latter as “coercion.”101  Any Lee  coercion
present in Newdow  was permissible, according to Rehnquist,
only because the Pledge is not a religious exercise.102
In fact, the Supreme Court in dicta has included the Pledge
within a category of cultural references to religion sometimes re-
ferred to as “ceremonial deism.”103  At times members of the
Court have justified the idea of ceremonial deism on the ground
that popular religious references, by virtue of repetition and ac-
ceptance by the masses, have lost their true religious character.104
At other times, some of the justices have opined that such refer-
ences, although religious, are used by government in a secular
way for such purposes as “solemnizing public occasions” and
“expressing confidence in the future.”105  A third justification for
excepting religious references such as “under God” is based on
the significance of religion and the multitude of religious refer-
ences in the Nation’s history since the founding.106  Nonetheless,
101 Compare  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2327-30
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring), with id . at 2320 n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring),
and id . at 2326-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that coercion is permissible in
cases of ceremonial deism, though “overt” coercion, similar to compulsion, would
not be).
102 Id . at 2320 n.4.
103 See  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(adopting the phrase and including the Pledge in a category of practices that do not
violate the Establishment Clause).  In ruling that the Pledge does not violate the
Establishment Clause, the Seventh Circuit relied on Court dicta regarding ceremo-
nial deism. See  Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992).
104 See Lynch , 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“While I remain uncer-
tain about these questions, I would suggest that . . . the references to God contained
in the Pledge of Allegiance . . . [are] protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious
content.”).
105 Id.  at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring); accord id.  at 717 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (“Moreover, these references are uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular
purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some
national challenge in a manner that simply could not be fully served in our culture if
government were limited to purely non-religious phrases.”); see also County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1989) (noting that previously in dicta the
Court had approved the Pledge as consistent with the Establishment Clause); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 n.5 (1985) (O’Connor, J. concurring) (referring to her
concurrence in Lynch  as support for the proposition that the 1954 Amendment to
the Pledge adding the words “under God” did not render the Pledge
unconstitutional).
106 See Lynch , 465 U.S. at 676 (“One nation under God,” as part of the Pledge
evidences the country’s religious heritage); see also  Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that recitation of the
Pledge “may merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to
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the intuition of a number of Justices over the years that the
Pledge and similar references are constitutional is directly at
odds with the Court’s own Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The Ninth Circuit decision in Newdow  underscores the paradox
in the Court’s doctrine,  between the inclusion approach and that
of ceremonial deism.107
Justice O’Connor, the author of the endorsement test and, in-
creasingly, an influential justice in the development of the
Court’s Establishment clause doctrine, defended ceremonial de-
ism in her concurrence in Newdow .  Reiterating earlier justifica-
tions and providing a more nuanced exposition of others,
O’Connor highlighted four factors likely only to be present in the
case of the Pledge and other instances of ceremonial deism: (1)
the history and ubiquity of the practice; (2) the absence of wor-
ship or prayer; (3) the absence of reference to a particular relig-
ion; and (4) minimal religious content.108  Of course, to
acknowledge the minimal religious content of the Pledge con-
cedes the point that the Pledge is, by some standard, religious.
Yet Justice O’Connor insists that there are no de minimis consti-
tutional violations; rather, she explains that ceremonial refer-
ences simply do not offend the Constitution.109  In her discussion
of the history and ubiquity of the Pledge, O’Connor notes that in
have been founded ‘under God’”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 440 n.5 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (mentioning the Pledge and some of the legislative history
surrounding the 1954 Amendment without comment on its significance).
107 See  sources cited supra  note 30.  As evidence of the paradox in the Court’s
doctrine, compare Lee , for example, in which Justice Kennedy rejected a de minimis
argument often used to support ceremonial deism:
It is, we concede, a brief exercise during which the individual can concen-
trate on joining its message, meditating on her own religion, or let her mind
wander.  But the embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise
cannot be refuted by arguing that these prayers, and similar ones to be said
in the future, are of a de minimis character . . . .
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992), with Kennedy’s prescient analysis of
Newdow  in an earlier dissent:
To be sure, no one is obligated to recite th[e] phrase [under God], but it
borders on sophistry to suggest that the “‘reasonable atheist’” would not
feel less than a “‘full membe[r] of the political community’” every time his
fellow Americans recited, as a part of their expression of patriotism and
love for country, a phrase he believed to be false.
Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 673 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2322-27 (2004)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
109 “These references are not minor trespasses upon the Establishment Clause to
which I turn a blind eye.  Instead, their history, character, and context prevent them
from being constitutional violations at all.” Id . at 2323 (O’ Connor, J., concurring).
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the fifty years since the addition of the words “under God,” the
Pledge has only been challenged three times.110  This observation
purports to mirror an analysis under the defunct entanglement
prong of Lemon  as applied in an earlier case,111 but can also be
read to suggest that majority preferences perhaps play some role
in the analysis of ceremonial deism.
One could accept the judicially-created category of ceremonial
deism as an exception within the framework of Establishment
Clause doctrine, but the reasons supporting the exception are in-
consistent with the doctrine.  If the central problem is that a par-
ticular religious message excludes or offends certain listeners,
then it should not matter whether the message is part of a long-
standing practice or historical tradition.112  Likewise, the asser-
tion that “under God” does not mention a specific religion is
only partially true, for it surely references something by what it
excludes.  Granted, the phrase “under God” is generic in com-
parison to a more specific reference such as “under the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” for example, but it is unavoidably
different from such alternatives as “under the Lord God, Jeho-
vah,” or “under Allah,” and it necessarily excludes all religions
that do not incorporate the concept of God.  Nor does it help to
say that a given reference such as “under God” is more secular
than religious, either because the truly religious character has
worn off over time, because it is only minimally religious, or be-
cause it is being given a secular application.  Though arguably the
strongest justification, the fact that the Pledge can be classified as
neither worship nor prayer would ultimately seem to fail under
the same logic.  To be sure, in the eyes of the faithful, such cere-
monial references to God may not hold nearly the same religious
content as a fiery sermon or well-delivered homily.  But from the
perspective of the outsider, “One Nation under God” might be,
as the Ninth Circuit found, just as strikingly religious as “One
Nation under Vishnu” or “One Nation under no god.”113
110 Id.
111 See  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (noting that the only evi-
dence of religious divisiveness caused by the cre`che display was the filing of the
lawsuit in the case before the Court).
112 See  Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (“[N]o one acquires a
vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that
span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.”).
113 Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Newdow I), republished at  328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom.  Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (2004).
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One may question how, then, have several members of the
Court concluded over the years that the Pledge, including the
words “under God,” is constitutional?  Arguably implicit in the
ceremonial deism analysis is a type of balancing of the claims of
the outsider against the claims of the larger society.114  The un-
derlying question is at what point a claim of religious exclusion
or offense should give way to the will of the majority and its in-
terest in the status quo.  In the category of practices known as
ceremonial deism, the Court has apparently concluded that the
majority should prevail.  This position has not been adequately
supported, however, and it is unclear how long the Court can
preserve this category without a better explanation for its exis-
tence.  It would seem preferable, instead, to make explicit what
has previously been implicit: if in certain Establishment Clause
cases there is a reason to defer to majority preferences, the Court
should say so, and explain why.
2. Rethinking Majority/Minority Discourse
My suggestion that the interests of the majority should play an
explicit role in constitutional decision making probably seems
counterintuitive, to say the least.115  While there is some diver-
gence of opinion,116 most commentators agree that the Supreme
114 Cf.  Gey, supra  note 22, at 1872 (asking whether “the very concept of constitu-
tional triviality [is] one of the most effective mechanisms for maintaining
majoritarian control over public discourse”).
115 See, e.g. , Epstein, supra  note 30, at 2171 (“The purpose of the Constitution
generally, and the Establishment Clause specifically, is to protect minorities from
raw majoritarian impulses.”); see also  Loewy, supra  note 30, at 1059 (“If the Estab-
lishment Clause means anything, it must mean that whether this Nation is under
God or without God can neither depend on a vote of a temporary majority nor
vacillate according to the tenor of the times.”); cf.  Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads , 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117 (1992) (“[T]he purpose of the
Religion Clauses is to protect the religious lives of the people from unnecessary
intrusions of government . . . to foster a regime of religious pluralism, as distin-
guished from both majoritarianism and secularism.”).
116 A doctrinal obstacle to the normative view of the Supreme Court as the pro-
tector of minority rights in the Establishment Clause context is the ongoing debate
about whether the clause was originally intended to safeguard individual liberties.
Many have argued that the Establishment Clause was meant as a structural con-
straint on the federal government—to prevent it from taking actions to establish a
federal church and, more importantly, to prevent it from interfering with existing
state establishments. See, e.g. , AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREA-
TION AND RECONSTRUCTION 33-35 (1998); see also  Carl H. Esbeck, The Establish-
ment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Government Power , 84 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1998).  Under this line of analysis, the Establishment Clause was never intended to
have been incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
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Court should and does play a significant role in protecting minor-
ities, religious and otherwise, from majority encroachment.  Ma-
jorities can usually protect themselves in the political process,
and even in cases in which a court frustrates the majority’s ef-
forts, the conventional wisdom seems clear: “fundamental rights
. . . depend on the outcome of no elections.”117  But the wisdom
is not entirely clear in the Establishment Clause context.
A comparison can be made to the Free Exercise Clause, which
has traditionally protected religious minorities from the applica-
tion of laws that burden their religious practice.118  The Free Ex-
ercise Clause represents the idea that a given majority may not
write its laws in ways that overlook the impact on religious mi-
norities.  While Employment Division v. Smith119 subverts the
conventional wisdom by suggesting that religious minorities can
adequately protect themselves in the political process, post-
Smith  doctrine provides that, at a minimum, majorities cannot
craft laws that target religious minorities.120  The traditional con-
cept of the Free Exercise Clause as a safeguard for minority
rights makes perfect sense when thinking about the possibility of
a given community legislating minorities out of their religious
practices.121  In the Establishment Clause context, however, it
seems that majorities and minorities often have equally reasona-
ble, albeit different, claims.122  The minority wants to be free
from government messages about religion and the majority wants
to be free from government (read: court) interference with the
expression of its religious preferences.  When an exemption is
granted in the Free Exercise context, an insensitive majority may
AMAR at 33-35.  For a challenge to the view that the Supreme Court actually per-
forms a countermajoritarian function, see Klarman, supra  note 62.  In the Court’s
early school prayer decisions, for example, Klarman asserts that “[w]hile the rulings
plainly were contrary to the preferences of a national majority, they were not dra-
matically countermajoritarian, which is what they would have been had the Court
rendered them a generation earlier.” Id.  at 16.
117 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
118 See, e.g. , Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  The scope of this protec-
tion has shrunk in recent years. See  Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
119 494 U.S. at 872.
120 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
121 The Court’s current doctrine, on the other hand, reflects great concern for
minorities in the Establishment Clause context with little recognition of minority
vulnerability in the Free Exercise context.
122 In cases such as a religious tax, an organized school prayer, or a community
controlled by a religious group, for example, minorities would have the superior
claim to religious freedom.
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grunt at the scofflaw who smokes peyote free from criminal sanc-
tion, but the exemption in no sense thwarts the majority’s relig-
ious interests.123  In Establishment Clause cases, on the other
hand, a ruling in favor of a given religious minority requires im-
mediate termination of the majority’s chosen form of religious
expression.
This is not to say that the Establishment Clause should essen-
tially have no force, being interpreted as applying only to govern-
ment actions that would also be covered by the Free Exercise
Clause.  But it does suggest that there is a latent majoritarian
concern that rarely has been recognized in the Court’s doc-
trine.124  If we temporarily suspend the idea that, in all Establish-
123 Of course, under the post-Smith  regime, no such exemption would be granted.
See Smith , 494 U.S. at 902-07 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that even if the
compelling state interest test were used, Oregon could show compelling interest in
wholesale prohibition on peyote use).  My assertion somewhat flouts the Court’s
benefits/burdens test used in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock  to evaluate Free Exer-
cise accommodations under the Establishment Clause.  Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bul-
lock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).  This test can easily be criticized by noting that a benefit to
one segment of the population can always be construed as a corresponding burden
to another.  My point is that the respective religious burdens to the majority and the
minority are not equal.  The burden to the religious claimant—threat of legal sanc-
tion—is often immediate and serious.  The corresponding burden to the unexempted
is a diffused, nonreligious burden experienced by an undefined “other” that com-
poses the majority.
124 Members of the Court have, at times, expressed concerns about overbalance in
favor of the religious minority.  For example, Justice Frankfurter’s strikingly differ-
ent view of the problem in Barnette  suggests that, barring a restriction on free exer-
cise, he would have afforded more deference to the will of the majority:
That which to the majority may seem essential for the welfare of the state
may offend the consciences of a minority.  But, so long as no inroads are
made upon the actual exercise of religion by the minority , to deny the politi-
cal power of the majority to enact laws concerned with civil matters, simply
because they may offend the consciences of a minority, really means that
the consciences of a minority are more sacred and more enshrined in the
Constitution than the consciences of a majority.
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 662 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).  In his dissent in Allegheny , Justice Kennedy expressed simi-
lar concerns with respect to the application of the endorsement test in the
Establishment Clause context:
I am quite certain that [a Court observer] will take away a salient message
from our holding in these cases: The Supreme Court of the United States
has concluded that the First Amendment creates classes of religions based
on the relative numbers of their adherents.  Those religions enjoying the
largest following must be consigned to the status of least-favored faiths so
as to avoid any possible risk of offending members of minority religions.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 677 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Some have occasionally attempted to characterize this concern as a “majoritarian
free exercise” claim.  Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963)
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ment Clause cases, courts must favor minorities over majorities,
then the question would become one of how to determine who
wins.  I am not advocating a simple majority rules formulation—
two against the practice, ten for the practice, tens have it!125  Yet
the sheer numbers of the majority suggest that society as a whole
may have a significant interest in continuing a particular religious
practice or tradition.126  To decide, it would be helpful to con-
sider whether court-ordered cessation of the Pledge would pro-
mote inclusion.  The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Newdow  and the
Supreme Court precedent upon which it relies seem to be based
on a popular but unrealistic assumption that complete elimina-
tion of a symbol or practice promotes inclusion.  This is appar-
ently grounded in the idea that what represents no one includes
everyone.  It is doubtful that this latter assumption is true in most
cases, and one can think of several examples showing that it is
not.127
(rejecting such a claim on Establishment Clause grounds).  Whether the Court
should adopt or develop a right of majoritarian Free Exercise is beyond the scope of
this Essay.
125 For what appears to be an exposition of this view, see Samuel P. Huntington,
Under God , WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at Editorial Page.
126 In the case of the Pledge, there is a national rather than a local majority in
support of the current version, and the presence of a national controversy should
warrant, at a minimum, increased sensitivity by the Court. See  Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  In terms of minority interests, the
presence of a national majority in some ways diminishes and in other ways increases
the possibility of harm.  See discussion infra  Part II.B.
127 In the controversy surrounding the Los Angeles County seal discussed supra
note 80, for example, over 1000 citizens gathered outside the Hall of Administration
in Los Angeles to protest the Supervisors’ plan to remove the cross from the seal
and possibly replace it with an image of a Spanish mission and Native Americans.
See  Sue Fox, Protesters Rally for County Seal Cross , L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2004, at B1.
The protesters were not mollified by the idea that the cross would be replaced with a
Spanish mission, also a religious symbol, though one that is believed by the group
threatening suit to be more inclusive than the cross. See id.  The standard assump-
tion that “everyone will be happier” with the more secularized version is mythical.
Professor Stanley Fish has somewhat cynically argued that attempts to arrive at
any theory of church/state relations provide cover for what are essentially political
grabs for dominance.  Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Be-
tween Church and State , 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2274-75 (1997).  Fish criticizes
liberal theorists who typically seek greater church/state separation not for their ends
but for misunderstanding and misstating their means, which are, he argues, just as
intolerant as those of the so-called religious zealots. See id.  Speaking of such theo-
rists, Fish writes:
They don’t want to answer the question “How would you persuade the true
believer to abandon his efforts to write his beliefs into the law?” to be “By
scaring him with the spectre of perpetual conflict.”  They want to answer by
holding out a promise—of a better life, a better community, a better self—
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Perhaps more important, in cases in which courts have decided
in favor of the minority, the corresponding Establishment Clause
remedy of eliminating the practice often fails to send a message
of inclusion to members that had previously been excluded.  Be-
cause the community itself has not changed, the cessation of a
given practice is less likely to signal a sudden, collective change
of heart and more likely to communicate only compliance with a
court order.128  In many communities, a court mandate initiates
an awkward transformation process reflecting a combination of
reluctance and confusion.  Take for example, the Santa Fe Inde-
pendent School District’s football season policy.  By the time the
controversy in Santa Fe  reached the Supreme Court, the school
district had already made attempts to comply with a federal dis-
trict court order enjoining its practice of permitting prayer at
football games.129  The school district had developed an elabo-
rate policy that provided that students would vote on whether
there would be a pre-game “message,” “statement,” or “invoca-
tion” to be delivered, then required students to vote on the stu-
dent who would deliver the message.130  The policy further
provided that if it were to be enjoined by the court, then an auto-
matic fallback provision would take effect, requiring that any
messages or statements be “nonsectarian and nonproselytiz-
ing.”131  The school district’s response to the lower court injunc-
tion resulted in a policy with an apparent focus on creating a
constitutionally acceptable way to facilitate prayer, rather than
alleviating the concerns of dissenters.  On the other hand, in a
case like Lee , in which the school district policy advocated “in-
clusiveness and sensitivity,” the Court’s approach effectively pe-
nalized those efforts, noting that nonsectarian prayer, for
example, only serves to aggravate the offense of outsiders who
do not fit into the presumptively broader, more inclusive cate-
that will make the believer happy to forgo his present zeal for the sake of a
brighter and even glorious future.
Id.  at 2275.
128 This observation refutes Professor Garfield’s assertion that the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Newdow  communicates a societal commitment to inclusion “so unwaver-
ing that we are willing to sacrifice a cherished ritual to achieve our goal.”  Garfield,
supra  note 34, at 289.
129 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 296-98 (2000).
130 Id.  at 297-98.
131 Id.  at 297.
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gory.132  The Court’s logic may be accurate, but the result—ban-
ning the practice—does not promote inclusion.  And as a
practical matter, it is likely that a given majority will be less re-
sponsive, not more, to the wishes of the religious minority in the
future.133  Instead, it would seem better to allow the process of
inclusion to proceed, in whatever form it may take, as a sincere
and voluntary effort by a given community, rather than as “prin-
ciple imposed from above.”134
A natural response to these observations might be that the
Court’s unwillingness to defer to the desires of the majority may
nonetheless promote inclusion in the long run.  Even if a given
majority objects to a Supreme Court decision, that decision will
eventually change attitudes.  As many believe to have happened
with Brown , a Court “statement” on the issue will foster a future
society that is more inclusive than the present one.135  It is cer-
tainly possible that this may happen in the very long term.  This
response, however, reveals a larger problem imbedded within the
concept of inclusion.  Expecting a majority to change its religious
views and practices under a “better society” rationale incorpo-
rates a normative conclusion that some religionists, like segrega-
tionists, need changing.  Far from being neutral, this position
proceeds upon an unstated assumption that begs the very ques-
tion to be answered—whether the world would be a better place
with less public religion.
132 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).  The idea of “nonsectarian” prayer
may not only fail at being all-inclusive, it probably fails at being religious.
133 For example, in the first game of the season at Santa Fe after the Court’s deci-
sion, some students and spectators stood to engage in spontaneous prayer immedi-
ately before the start of the game, and there are reports of several similar
movements at other schools. See  Paul Duggan, A Few Texas Faithful Make Stand for
Prayer; Big Football Showing Fails to Happen , WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2002, at A1,
cited in  Feldman, supra  note 55, at 720.
134 STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 117 (1995).
[I]n a pluralistic community exhibiting a considerable degree of religious
and secular diversity, civil peace and inclusiveness can be achieved only
imperfectly and only through compromise, cultivated tolerance, mutual
forbearances, and strategic silences.  In this context, the judicial imposition
of any  set of consistent and explicit principles is likely to undermine the
possibilities for compromise and forbearance, and hence to aggravate the
dangers of civil strife and alienation.  Civil peace, in short, must be the
product of prudence, not of principle imposed from above.
Id .
135 Cf. , e.g. , Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law , 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021 (1996).
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B. The Anecdotal Evidence
The evidence that is generally offered to support inclusion as a
protector of religious minorities is anecdotal.  Eschewing any
claim (for the purposes of this Essay) to an originalist assessment
of inclusion, I have no problem evaluating anecdotal evidence.
Most of us draw conclusions about the world around us based on
our own personal experiences, so it seems to make perfect sense
to listen to the stories of others, particularly when the stories are
different than our own.  Some of the most compelling stories
have moved the Court’s jurisprudence in groundbreaking direc-
tions that now seem correct as a matter of social policy.
1. The Cost of Dissent
In many Establishment Clause cases there is some evidence of
accompanying background harms that exist distinct from the al-
leged harm caused by the religious practices.  Chief among these
harms is religious persecution, which many argue provides good
reason to promote inclusion as a touchstone of the Establishment
Clause.  The Court has rarely focused on this background dis-
crimination, though it has often cited historical religious persecu-
tion as a reason for the adoption of the religion clauses.
To be sure, religious minorities—including the nonreligious as
well as those of minority religious faiths136—face persecution.
Many of the early First Amendment cases reflect the divisiveness
of communities in which the Protestant majority actively fought
the cultural infusion of Mormons,137 Jehovah’s Witnesses,138 and
Catholics.139  In recent times, in cases representing predomi-
nantly Protestant communities in Bible Belt states such as Missis-
sippi and Alabama, students who dissented from religious
themes and practices found themselves the subjects of ridicule
and ostracism.140  The reported instances of backlash have not
136 This group also includes members of the majority religion who do not share
certain majority beliefs and members of the majority religion who do not approve of
public religious expression.
137 See, e.g. , Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
138 See, e.g. , Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Minersville Sch. Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by  W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
139 See , e.g. , Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also  Jeffries & Ryan,
supra  note 27.
140 See, e.g. , Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Miss.
1995).  For example, Mississippi school children who challenged religious broadcasts
over the intercom and student-led classroom prayers were allegedly referred to as
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been limited to Southern states.141  Worse still, persecution can
take far more violent forms.  Plaintiffs challenging school prayer
and other religious exercises, for example, have been subjected
to hate mail, death threats, physical violence, and humiliation.142
These examples have caused many to conclude that elimina-
tion of potentially divisive religious practices is the only means to
prevent future skirmishes.  This position has some merit if the
persons participating in and facilitating the religious practices are
the same persons responsible for the persecution.  For example,
in cases in which school officials and peers mistreat children who
refuse to say the Pledge, it would appear that a reasonable re-
sponse could be to eliminate the practice.  A better response,
however, would be to administer some sort of sensitivity training
for students and school officials.143  If we trust individuals with
“atheists” and “devil-worshippers” by teachers, among others, in front of other stu-
dents. See STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 403-05 (2001).  And, in Ala-
bama, two Jewish public school students were reportedly taunted and referred to by
students as “Jew boys” and “Jewish jokers.”  One of the two boys was forced by a
teacher to bow his head during a Christian prayer at an assembly, while the other
was required to write an essay about Jesus as a form of discipline. Id .
141 See RAVITCH, supra  note 68, at 3-18.
142 See id .
143 A recent free speech case demonstrates the need for some sort of training that
could facilitate non-alienating responses to dissent.  At the center of Holloman v.
Harland , 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004), is an Alabama statute which requires the
State Board of Education and local school boards to develop character education
programs to inculcate such values as courage, patriotism, respect for others, self-
control, courtesy, tolerance, diligence, and patience. Id.  at 1261-62.  As a part of this
program of character education, the statute includes voluntary recitation of the
Pledge. Id.  One morning in a twelfth-grade economics and government class, a
student stood silent with his hands in his pockets during the daily recitation of the
Pledge. Id.  Immediately after the other students finished reciting the Pledge, the
teacher confronted the student openly. Id.  When the student responded that he no
longer desired to say the Pledge, the teacher questioned incredulously, “You don’t
want to say the Pledge and the United States Air Force Academy has given you a
scholarship?” Id.  at 1260.  Upset by the teacher’s handling of the situation, a second
student protested the following day by silently raising his fist in the air during the
Pledge. Id.  at 1261.  The teacher chastised the second student in front of the class,
and the second student later sued, claiming a free speech violation and an Establish-
ment Clause claim based on other classroom activities. Id.  As part of its program to
promote values such as tolerance and patience, the local school board could have
instructed teachers that students are constitutionally permitted to refuse to salute
the flag.  Instead, the teacher’s handling of the situation snowballed into a more
noticeable protest by a second student and ultimately, a lawsuit.
Of course, sensitivity training for students necessarily raises other issues.  Those
conducting such training should be careful to avoid criticizing the substance of relig-
ious beliefs and instead focus on criticizing inappropriate behavior.  This distinction
is not easily appreciated and has caused some to question the propriety of teaching
civic morality in public schools. Compare  Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864
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the authority to act as teachers and administrators on behalf of
the state, then presumably we can expect them to treat all chil-
dren with respect.144  Likewise, students should learn as early as
possible to respect those who may come from different religious
backgrounds or have different religious views.  Because the relig-
ious practice triggers the dissent and corresponding backlash, it
serves to illuminate the existence of insensitivity in the public
schools.  Better to face the problem, however gruesome, than to
simply turn off the light.
More difficult are the cases in which those acting out against
dissenters are neither students nor school officials.  Apparently
these individuals, likely parents and other members of the local
community, become aware of the dissent as a result of publicity
which may include media coverage of ensuing litigation.  That
the proposed elimination of public religious exercises unearths
persons willing to commit acts of cruelty and violence is scary
indeed.145  Unfortunately, the state has no direct control over
these individuals except perhaps through the criminal law.  With
respect to these individuals, elimination of the religious practice
might remove otherwise identifiable targets for their frustration
and violence.  Of course, this would also penalize law-abiding
students who desired to participate in the practices.
2. Subjective Emotional Experience
In the Establishment Clause cases discussed in this Essay, the
constitutional harm consists of the subjective emotional experi-
(1982) (noting that schools bear the burden of teaching the values necessary for
citizenship), with  Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and
State , 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 301-02 (2002) (arguing that teaching students critical
rationality, one popular tenet of which is tolerance, interferes with the family’s abil-
ity to cultivate religious values in children).
144 This reveals my background assumption that people harm others because of
insensitivity.  I do not assume, as others may, that an excessive or aberrant religious
disposition causes some to discriminate against those with different beliefs. Cf. , e.g. ,
RAVITCH, supra  note 68, at 79-81, 84 (regarding Christian fundamentalism,
“[c]ertainly, some individuals who share these views can rise above the urge to be
intolerant, but the views themselves do not promote a great deal of tolerance toward
those with divergent beliefs.”).
145 Violent actions and outbursts by parents are apparently more common than
we would like to think.  A recent example in a different context involves a mother
who was ejected from a high school basketball game for yelling obscenities and a
father who body-slammed a referee in retaliation. Parent Body-Slams Ref at High
School Basketball Game , CNN.COM (Feb. 10, 2004), at  http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/
Northeast/02/10/referee.assault.ap/index.html.
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ence of persons deemed to be excluded from the religious
messages.146  While the Court’s post-Brown  equal protection ju-
risprudence has not focused on feelings, the Court’s Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence is vulnerable to the same criticism
leveled at the reasoning in Brown—that it is based on intangible
rather than concrete harms.147  This is not to deny the powerful,
negative emotions that a Jew or Muslim may experience while
looking at a cre`che, or that an atheist may experience while lis-
tening to the words “under God.”  As Michael Newdow has ex-
plained in other places, he resents looking at coins that say “In
God We Trust” when he does not trust in God.148  To create a
similar impact for those less likely to be offended by civil refer-
ences to God, one commentator asks the reader to consider her
reaction upon hearing a series of hypothetical openings for the
United States Supreme Court, including, “Satan save the United
States and this Honorable Court.”149
But feelings, however potent, can be an unreliable basis upon
which to find a constitutional violation.  To risk stating the obvi-
ous, an individual’s feelings are constantly subject to change
based on factors that courts are ill-equipped to evaluate.  Be-
cause of the idiosyncratic nature of feelings, the same message
may rouse different emotions in different observers.150  It is also
146 See supra  Part I.B.
147 Even ideologically opposed commentators such as Professor Derrick Bell and
Justice Clarence Thomas appear to agree on the narrow proposition that the most
serious problem with Jim Crow was not the asserted negative psychological effects
on the black children involved. See, e.g. , Derrick A. Bell, in WHAT Brown v. Board
of Education SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack Balkin ed., 2001) (chastising the majority
for failing to recognize that the schools were not equal); Clarence Thomas, Toward a
“Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of Independence in Constitu-
tional Interpretation , 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 990-91 (1987) (noting that Brown  failed to
acknowledge segregation’s origins in slavery).
148 See Howard Fineman et al., One Nation Under . . . Who? , NEWSWEEK, July 8,
2002, at 25.
149 See  Loewy, supra  note 30, at 1055.
150 This problem, sometimes articulated in terms of perspective, has been a linger-
ing conceptual difficulty in the Court’s application of the endorsement test. See,
e.g. , Karst, supra  note 67, at 515; see also  Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No Endorsement’ Test , 86
MICH. L. REV. 266, 291-93 (1987) (“Whose perceptions count?”); Sullivan, supra
note 28, at 207 (“Not to see the cre`che as sending a message of exclusion to Jews,
Muslims or atheists is to see the world through Christian-tinted glasses.”); Laurence
H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Psuedo-Scien-
tific Sieve , 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 162 (1984).  Justice O’Connor has defended the
endorsement test against these perceived problems:
Saying that the endorsement inquiry should be conducted from the per-
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true that a presumably offensive message may evoke a strikingly
different reaction in the same observer, depending upon numer-
ous considerations, including context and the identity of the
speaker.151  Attempting to address these inevitable difficulties,
the Court has adopted the “reasonable observer” standard.
Thus, whether the Court comprehends the emotional harm de-
pends upon its own willingness to accept the plaintiff’s character-
ization of cause and effect.  In terms of outcome, it was certainly
fortunate that the Court in Brown  was disposed to accept the
plaintiffs’ interpretation of the impact of segregation.  An earlier
Court confronted with what was essentially the same claim, how-
ever, glibly concluded that racial segregation communicated a
“badge of inferiority,” if at all, only because blacks chose to in-
terpret it that way.152
spective of a hypothetical observer who is presumed to possess a certain
level of information that all citizens might not share neither chooses the
perceptions of the majority over those of a ‘reasonable non-adherent,’ . . .
nor invites disregard for the values the Establishment Clause was intended
to protect. It simply recognizes the fundamental difficulty inherent in fo-
cusing on actual people: There is always someone  who, with a particular
quantum of knowledge, reasonably might perceive a particular action as an
endorsement of religion.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.
Ct. 2301, 2321-22 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
151 Cf. , e.g. , RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUB-
LESOME WORD 159-71 (2002).  Suppose that, for example, in town X composed
mostly of Muslims, the court clerk posted on a wall in the town courthouse a sign
that stated, “Only valid religious reasons may excuse you from jury duty service,”
with a small star and crescent appearing at the bottom of the sign.  Suppose alterna-
tively that in town Y, also composed mostly of Muslims, the town clerk posted an
identical sign.  Assume also that at a hearing in the respective cases challenging the
postings in towns X and Y, each town clerk testified that she recently obtained a
new “clip art” database for her office computer and was merely experimenting with
religious symbols to accompany the sign, with no intention to endorse a particular
religion.  Citizen A of Town X, a Christian, believes that the town council members
and court clerk are respectful of Christianity because she has seen them at meetings
and other events sponsored by her local church.  She is not offended by the sign and
is likely to believe the clerk’s testimony.  On the other hand, if Citizen A views the
same posting in Town Y, knowing little about the local government, she is likely to
be offended; she may very well assume that the town has intended to communicate
that only religious duties arising from Islam could provide an excuse from jury ser-
vice.  For loosely similar facts only as to the circumstances surrounding the clip art,
see, for example, Granzeier v. Middleton , 955 F. Supp. 741, 747 (E.D. Ky. 1997)
(finding county courthouse closing in observation of Good Friday constitutional but
invalidating sign posted on county building noting the closing and depicting a clip-
art crucifix).
152 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) overruled by  Brown v. Bd. of
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Even if we could identify with precision emotional harms that
rise to the level of constitutional significance, and even if we
could maintain over time a composition of the Supreme Court
that would consistently appreciate such harms, there is a bigger
problem with hinging our Establishment Clause doctrine on feel-
ings.  Absolute freedom from offense is untenable in a society
that places a certain premium on unbridled expression.  Allowing
a person’s feelings of exclusion to dictate what is appropriate
reduces Establishment Clause jurisprudence to that of the least
common denominator—an approach that is inconsistent with the
generally accepted value of tolerance that illuminates our under-
standing of the religion clauses and the Free Speech Clause.153
Finally, freedom from offense does not encapsulate the relig-
ious persecution that the Establishment Clause has been under-
stood to prevent.  Traditionally, religious minorities have sought
the freedom to dissent from mainstream practices that marginal-
ized their religious traditions, not the right to eradicate all mani-
festations of religion that may offend.  By advocating what has
occasionally been termed a “religion of secularism,”154 defenders
of the religious minority aim to transform the public square into
one in which dissent is no longer required.  Supporters of this
position argue that a religion-free environment is preferable to
protect religious minorities and ensure that the state plays no
role in facilitating or perpetuating the angst and discomfort often
associated with minority status.155  The underlying assumption is
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also  Tribe, supra  note 150, at 162 (comparing Lynch
to Plessy  and arguing that, in each case, the Court used the wrong perspective).
153 See, e.g. , United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (hearing a free exercise
challenge).
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and ex-
treme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them,
and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree.
They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possi-
ble toleration of conflicting views.
Id . at 87; see also  Marshall, supra  note 67.
154 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[A]ffirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, leads to ‘preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe.’”).
155 Presiding over the case involving the Mississippi plaintiffs, Judge Biggers con-
cluded that an opt-out remedy would fail to protect religious minorities from psy-
chological harm:
Permitting students to absent themselves from broadcasts or classroom
prayer which they find offensive does not cure the Establishment Clause
problem and can be a destructive approach.  Contrary to its stated purpose
and intent, organized prayer in public schools does not unite students from
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that there is no (equally) legitimate competing concern—reli-
gionists can practice their religion at home or in other private
places.156
Let us spend a moment evaluating the assumption.  A standard
of inclusion no doubt rectifies some feelings of outsider status
created by majoritarian religious manifestations.  On the other
hand, elimination of the practice achieves inclusion only at the
expense of the majority, who experience a different but co-exten-
sive emotional harm.157  If public school application of the
various backgrounds and beliefs but, instead, segregates students along re-
ligious lines.  The plaintiff’s children are likely to feel ostracized and stig-
matized if their beliefs do not coincide with those of the majority. . . . A
method of accommodation that is inclusive of those students who wish to
participate is far better than a practice that excludes those that do not.
Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 902, 911 (N.D. Miss. 1995);
accord  Steven Gey, When is Religious Speech Not “Free Speech”? , 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 379, 460 n.273 (2000) (citing several examples of religious persecution, includ-
ing those mentioned above) (“[R]eligious exercises in public school –- including mo-
ments of silence that operate as de facto prayer sessions for a majority of the class –-
focus a daily spotlight on the private religious beliefs of those who do not share the
majority’s faith and make those beliefs the object of constant public debate and (all
too often) scorn.”); see also  Newsom, supra  note 68, at 334-35 (acknowledging that
the separationist approach is “strategically” secular if not religiously secular (in the
sense of Secular Humanism), and best protects religious minorities and their families
from psychological harm).
156 See, e.g. , Newsom, supra  note 68, at 333-34 (relating to the context of religious
instruction during school and on school premises after hours); see also STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993).
157 Some might argue that the logic of recognizing an emotional harm to the relig-
ious majority would support recognizing a corresponding emotional harm to whites
as a result of Brown  or other antidiscrimination policies such as affirmative action.
The symmetry of the logic offers some appeal, but it is here that religion seems most
distinct from race.  One commentator attempts to articulate this distinction when
evaluating the propriety of government action allocating benefits to “whites” as a
group, as compared to allocating benefits to a religious majority:
Deliberately benefiting the racial majority concomitantly prejudices racial
minorities.  It therefore . . . plainly violates existing constitutional principles
as well as moral norms . . . .  [I]t is possible that favor or support for some
religions may be viewed as public appreciation for certain appealing beliefs
or for various wholesome activities rather than as an indirect expression of
disrespect toward other, ‘nonpreferred’ religions.  The overtones of racial
prejudice and intolerance historically associated with messages of white
supremacy, for example, are simply not present.  Thus, favoring the domi-
nant racial group realistically imposes the same constitutionally forbidden
harm as deliberately disadvantaging racial minorities, and should almost
always be invalid.  Assisting mainstream religious groups, however, need
not be forbidden, in my judgment, unless it adversely affects religious
liberty.
Jesse H. Choper, Race and Religion Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differ-
ences , 79 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 500-02 (1994).  For a critique of Choper’s analysis,
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Pledge, including “under God,” or a city’s display of a cre`che,
sends a message to religious minorities that they are “outsiders,
not full members of the political community,” then what does
elimination of “under God” or court-ordered dismantling of the
cre`che communicate?  The corresponding message to the relig-
ious majority is that their efforts to express religiosity publicly
will be met with disdain.158  The message is one of disapproval—
probably worse than if the display had never been erected, or
worse than if “under God” had never been a part of the Pledge.
Perhaps, however, it could be asserted that the type of emotional
harm experienced by the majority is conceptually distinct:  It is
one thing to feel excluded and alone, quite another to feel ex-
cluded but within a large group of others similarly situated.  Yet
this seems to discount the impact of a government message.  The
outsider feeling stems from the perception that the government
has taken sides on matters of religion, declaring which belief is
right or, alternatively, which is wrong. As to this specific affront,
approval can be no worse than disapproval.159  Those who advo-
see Gary J. Simson, Laws Intentionally Favoring Mainstream Religions: An Un-
helpful Comparison to Race , 79 CORNELL L. REV. 514 (1994).
158 Cf. , e.g. , Smith, supra  note 150, at 310-11 (evaluating the endorsement test):
If public institutions employ religious symbols, persons who do not adhere
to the predominant religion may feel like ‘outsiders.’  But if religious sym-
bols are banned from such contexts, some religious people will feel that
their most central values and concerns—and thus, in an important sense,
they themselves—have been excluded from a public culture devoted to
purely secular concerns.
Id .  A separationist might respond that religionists are free to use private space to
express their beliefs.  McConnell answers this argument with the observation that a
completely secular public square marginalizes religion:
The problem with the secularization baseline is that it is not neutral in any
realistic sense. . . [W]hen the government owns the streets and parks, which
are the principal sites for public communication and community celebra-
tion, the schools, which are a principal means for transmitting ideas and
values to future generations, and many of the principal institutions of cul-
ture, exclusion of religious ideas, symbols, and voices marginalizes religion
in much the same way that the neglect of the contributions of African
Americans and other minority citizens, or of the viewpoints and contribu-
tions of women, once marginalized those segments of society.  Silence
about a subject can covey a powerful message.  When the public sphere is
open to ideas and symbols representing nonreligious viewpoints, cultures
and ideological commitments, to exclude all those whose basis is “relig-
ious” would profoundly distort public culture.
McConnell, supra  note 115, at 189 (evaluating Supreme Court Establishment Clause
jurisprudence with respect to legislative accommodations and public religious
displays).
159 See  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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cate a standard of inclusion have largely failed to recognize any
possible psychological harm to members of the majority, assum-
ing instead that public displays of faith are mere attempts to com-
municate dominance to outsiders.160  In fact, both sides may
experience a type of psychological harm; neither harm should be
the basis for a violation of the Establishment Clause.
3. An Alternative Story
Thus far, I have argued that feelings of exclusion, however
powerful, should not be the basis for an Establishment Clause
violation.  Rather than propose an abstract thought experiment
to support this view, it seems preferable to evaluate a real life
example.  Consider the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Long despised for
their door-to-door proselytization and rejection of mainstream
practices, the Jehovah’s Witnesses have apparently learned to ac-
cept the social consequences that accompany dissent from the re-
ligious and secular mainstream.  To appreciate this picture, one
need not go back to the wartime setting of Barnette  and the chil-
dren who refused to salute the flag.  Imagine instead the twenty-
first century Jehovah’s Witness child’s reaction to her first class-
room birthday party in public school, in which, for religious rea-
sons, the child must refuse to participate in the festivities,
including birthday cake.161  How does the child cope with the
considerable peer pressure to participate, and the ostracization
that most surely results from refusal to do so?  We can readily
observe that the school, in permitting a teacher-supervised class-
room party, has created an environment which highlights the
child’s difference and facilitates any resulting peer pressure due
to non-conformity.  Yet most would intuitively conclude that the
appropriate remedy for the child and her parents is advance no-
tice and exemption.  We would not  say that the party violates the
Establishment Clause.  Not because the peer pressure and result-
ing ostracization are not real, but because they are not what the
Establishment Clause can logically and coherently be read to
160 But cf.  Loewy, supra  note 30, at 1063.  Loewy acknowledges the possibility of
a disapproval outcome, and argues that the Court’s cases involving a state’s denial of
equal access to religious groups and a state exclusion of ministers from elected office
can be justified on that ground.  Nonetheless, those cases involved the denial of a
tangible benefit such as access in addition to any abstract emotional harm.
161 For a brief explanation of official teaching on this subject, see, for example,
Beliefs and Customs That Displease God , at  http://www.watchtower.org/ library/rq/
article_11.htm (last visited July 10, 2004).
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prevent162—at least not without completely eliminating many
classroom activities.  This must no doubt be the implicit reason-
ing in cases rejecting the assertion that public school observance
of Halloween and classroom time devoted to similar themes vio-
late the Establishment Clause, though many parents desire to
avoid the impact of such practices.163
C. Diversity and Tolerance
Most assume that the inclusion approach maximizes the values
of diversity and tolerance, usually referred to collectively, which
should and do receive a high premium in today’s social and legal
discourse.164  The strands of diversity and tolerance can unravel
into distinct concepts with different implications.  The Court’s in-
clusion approach, at work in the Ninth Circuit’s Newdow  opin-
ion, can be viewed as an attempt at a sort of religious correctness
based on the value of diversity.  Elimination of the words “under
God” acknowledges that there are those in the minority who
162 Cf . McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1948) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). In sharp contrast to Justice Frankfurter’s suggestion, Justice Jackson doubted
that the Establishment Clause should be construed to protect religious minorities
against psychic harm:
The complaint is that when others join and he does not, it sets him apart as
a dissenter, which is humiliating . . . . [I]t may be doubted whether the
Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be con-
strued also to protect one from the embarrassment that always attends
nonconformity, whether in religion, politics, behavior or dress.  Since no
legal compulsion is applied to complainant’s son himself and no penalty is
imposed or threatened from which we may relieve him, we can hardly base
jurisdiction on this ground.
Id .
163 See , e.g ., Guyer v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 634 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (“Witches, cauldrons, and brooms in the context of a school Hallow-
een celebration appear to be nothing more than a ‘mere shadow,’ if that, in the
realm of establishment clause jurisprudence.”); see also Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of
Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 680, 688 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994) (regarding parental challenge to use of
Impressions reading series in public elementary school on the ground that the series
contained references to concepts found in paganism, witchcraft and satanism)
(“Many of the stories involving witches are sequenced to emphasize a Halloween
theme.  The American tradition of celebrating the eve of All Saints’ Day is certainly
a secular one.”); Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1383
(9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge to Impressions reading series alleging,
inter alia , that activities assertedly approximating witchraft denigrate Christianity
and make students feel like outsiders); cf.  Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245
F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the celebration of Earth Day at public high
school did not endorse Gaia religion).
164 See, e.g. , Garfield, supra  note 34 (repeatedly using the terms “inclusive” and
“tolerant” together).
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would prefer not to be confronted with the idea.  This approach
leaves behind the connected concept of tolerance, however,
which usually requires those in the majority to accept with pa-
tience an idea or practice promoted by those in the minority, but
in the case of the Pledge, creates some tension for the minority to
accept the practice of the majority.
No doubt to some the majority’s plea for tolerance may at first
glance seem specious—perhaps akin to the claim that members
of a racial majority who do not benefit from affirmative action
and similar programs have been the victims of invidious discrimi-
nation.165  But society can be quite intolerant of some members
of the overall religious majority, especially when those persons
are themselves deemed to be intolerant.166  In Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education ,167 for example, the Sixth Circuit re-
jected the Free Exercise claim of religionist students and their
parents who sought an exemption from exposure to the allegedly
Secular Humanist positions taken in the Holt Reading Series.
The material in the readers contradicted the fundamentalist
Christian teachings of the parents, which promoted the concept
of absolute truth and the supremacy of God’s will over diversity
of belief and individual preferences.168  Because much of the ma-
165 This is not intended to express an opinion on whether such a view of affirma-
tive action is, in fact, specious. See  discussion supra  note 157.  For an example of
such skepticism, see Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility, and Religion: A
Critique of the Privilege That Christianity Has Enjoyed in the United States , 54 ALA.
L. REV. 617, 633 (2003) (“No person should be ostracized by society and made to
feel aberrant simply because the majority believes that it can exercise its rights to
religious freedom whenever it wishes.”).
166 Variations of this theme have been raised both by those who could be charac-
terized as sympathetic as well as those who probably would be opposed to my over-
all position in this Essay. See, e.g. , Michael W. McConnell, “God is Dead and We
Have Killed Him!”: Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age , 1993 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 163, 187 (1993) (“This is the phenomenon of selective multi-culturalism:
boundless tolerance and respect for some voices, and ruthless suppression of others.
Religion is an especially vulnerable target because religion represents the wisdom of
the ages, which is an obstacle to the transformation of society.”); see, e.g. , Fish,
supra  note 127, at 2293 (“Tolerance is defined in a way that renders the troubling
views unworthy to receive it; openness of mind turns out to be closed to any form of
thought not committed to its hegemony . . . .”); cf ., e.g. ,  Martha Minow, Putting Up
and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered , in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
FEDERALISM 77, 84 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990) (“Secular humanism . . . is not a sol-
vent of tolerance for all points of view but a conflicting belief system . . . .”).  Need-
less to say, my argument here will not persuade those who believe that intolerance
of the intolerant is necessary or desirable.
167 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
168 Id.  at 1060; see also  Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me
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terial in the Holt Series was antithetical to the students’ religious
training, the parents claimed that mere exposure to the Holt Se-
ries would seriously undermine their children’s efforts to main-
tain their own religious values.169  The remedy sought by the
plaintiffs in Mozert , an exemption, was much narrower than the
remedy for an Establishment Clause challenge, which would
have required complete removal of the Holt Series from the cur-
riculum.  Nonetheless, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ position
that in light of the curriculum’s sharp conflict with their religious
views, it was anything but neutral.170  Similar Establishment
Clause challenges to public school curricula have likewise
failed.171
To be sure, the court’s decision in Mozert  does not conclu-
sively prove the larger point about intolerance, but it does show,
in my view, that our background judgments about religion filter
our assessment of these problems.  If the right answer for the
plaintiffs in Mozert  and in similar cases is to “put up”172 with
what they view as pervasive secularism, why is token or ceremo-
nial religiosity not also something to be tolerated, at least in
Out”:  Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education , 106
HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).  As Stolzenberg explains, Mozert  highlights a compelling
paradox.  A curriculum that purports to teach respect for cultural and religious dif-
ference by requiring students to accept competing religious philosophies as equal to
their own is necessarily intolerant of students who believe that there is only one
truth.
169 Mozert , 827 F.2d at 1060.
170 Id.  at 1070.
171 See, e.g. , Smith v. Bd. of School Comm’rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (chal-
lenge to allegedly secular humanist aspects of public school home economics, his-
tory, and social studies textbooks); see also  Fleischfresser v. Dirs. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d
680 (7th Cir. 1994); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
In one publicized case, a federal district court rejected an Establishment Clause
claim by Christian students and their parents challenging a seventh-grade curriculum
that included an extended segment on Islam. See  Bob Egelko, Judge OKs Islamic
Role-Playing in Classroom/Contra Costa County Parents’ Suit Dismissed , S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 12, 2003, at A2.  The plaintiffs did not object to the mere exposure of
students to Islam, but to requirements that students adopt Muslim names, recite
Muslim prayers in class and give up television or candy to simulate fasting for Rama-
dan. See id.  In its unpublished decision, the district court reasoned that the eight
week curriculum did not violate the Establishment Clause because the simulated
exercises were not the actual religious rites required by Islam, and students did not
perform the activities with “devotional or religious intent.” See  Order Granting De-
fendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Eklund v. Byron Union Sch. Dist.,
No. C02-3004 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
172 Cf . Mozert , 827 F.2d at 1080-81 (“Our holding requires plaintiff to put up with
what they perceive as an unbalanced public school curriculum, so long as the curric-
ulum does not violate the Establishment Clause.”).
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some cases?  The very concept of diversity means that in a multi-
plicity of messages, there may be some objectionable ones.  Di-
versity costs, and tolerance is the price we pay for preserving it.
A case that stretches the limits of tolerance is Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States ,173 in which the Supreme Court upheld
the withdrawal by the Internal Revenue Service of the funda-
mentalist Christian university’s tax-exempt status because it
maintained rules against interracial dating.  The Court’s decision
probably seemed like a substantial victory for diversity—but not
necessarily from the perspective of those who advocate tolerance
for divergent religious views and practices.174  However con-
founding one may find Bob Jones’ position that rules prohibiting
interracial dating do not amount to race discrimination, its posi-
tion was religiously held.175  The best place to tell Bob Jones that
it is wrong is in the marketplace, as when a prominent televange-
list minister with a viewing audience of several million wrote a
three volume series and spent a full year of television broadcasts
deriding racism in the evangelical movement and criticizing, in
particular, prohibitions on interracial dating.176
The foregoing examples begin to demonstrate the folly in the
assumption that there exists a value-free, religion-neutral ap-
proach to which we can aspire.177  In fact, the concept of inclu-
sion necessarily exalts certain values over others.  In Lee , Justice
Kennedy acknowledged but dismissed the double standard objec-
tion of the majority:  “[S]tudents may consider it an odd measure
of justice to be subjected during the course of their education to
ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief,
173 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
174 But cf.  Minow, supra  note 166, at 91 (using this as one of several examples to
suggest that threats to cultural integrity due to antidiscrimination policies stand on a
different footing).
175 The Court characterized the conflict in Bob Jones  as a clash between the Uni-
versity’s free exercise and the governmental interest in “eradicating racial discrimi-
nation in education.” Bob Jones Univ. , 461 U.S. at 604. Bob Jones  presents a
nontrivial conflict between First and Fourteenth Amendment values, and I do not
mean to suggest here that one automatically trumps the other.  The more obscure
and unyielding the beliefs, however, the more comfortable we may feel, rightly or
wrongly, in making a choice between the two.
176 See , e.g. , 1 FREDERICK K.C. PRICE, RACE, RELIGION AND RACISM (1999) (ar-
guing that rules prohibiting interracial dating signal a form of racial prejudice en-
tirely unsupported in Scripture).
177 Cf.  Jeffries & Ryan, supra  note 27, at 368 (acknowledging in the context of
school prayer that “no meaningful opportunity for complete neutrality as between
religion and nonreligion exists”).
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formal prayer ceremony that the school offers in return.”178
Kennedy explained that the special character of religion as being
both favored under the Free Exercise Clause and disfavored
under the Establishment Clause, a “fundamental dynamic” of the
Constitution, rendered this argument unavailing.179  But Ken-
nedy’s conclusion necessarily depends on one’s interpretation of
the Establishment Clause.  In the Court’s modern jurisprudence,
that interpretation has tended toward a balance in favor of relig-
ious minorities with little consideration for the interests of a
given religious majority.  In the view of Judge O’Scannlain, writ-
ing for the judges dissenting from the Ninth’s Circuit’s refusal to
grant rehearing, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow  vividly
depicts the result of such an overbalance:
In affording Michael Newdow the right to impose his views on
others, Newdow II  affords him a right to be fastidiously intol-
erant and self-indulgent.  In granting him this supposed right,
moreover, the two-judge panel majority has not eliminated
feelings of discomfort and isolation, it has simply shifted them
from one group to another.180
Sometimes it is better to put up with what puts you off.181
CONCLUSION
It makes perfect sense for a reasonable society to be concerned
about religious oppression and coercion.  That Brown  and simi-
lar antidiscrimination ideas arguably sensitized the Court to sub-
tler harms experienced by religious minorities represented a
positive development.  As the Court’s Establishment Clause doc-
trine shifted to reflect similar ideas, however, it took a dangerous
turn.  The Establishment Clause, with its attendant all-or-nothing
remedy, has proved too broad an instrument to address harms
created by merely offensive or exclusionary practices.
In an apparent effort to rectify this result as applied to a nar-
row class of practices, several members of the Court have repeat-
edly stated that the current Pledge of Allegiance, the national
178 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).
179 Id .
180 Newdow v. United States Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 481 (9th Cir. 2003)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), republished at  328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub
nom.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
181 I acknowledge the view that tolerance defined as no more than putting up with
what one dislikes is less than ideal. Cf.  Minow, supra  note 166, at 92 (arguing that
the term “putting up” itself suggests a form of superiority or dominance on the part
of the group doing the putting up).
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motto “One Nation under God,” and similar ceremonial relig-
ious references do not offend the Establishment Clause. None-
theless, this category is plainly inconsistent with the Court’s
recent approach in Establishment Clause cases.  The Court’s cre-
ation of an ad hoc category of approved practices appears to re-
flect a type of balancing of the will of the religious majority
against the interests of the religious minority.  But this balancing
has never been adequately explained.  Thus ceremonial deism ex-
ists as a type of doctrinal anomaly in the larger context of the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which focuses
largely on the reaction of the religious minority to a given relig-
ious message, and tends to balance in favor of the religious
minority.
Given this paradox, the Ninth Circuit in Newdow  was not un-
reasonable in assuming that, absent more explanation, the Court
might be willing to retreat from ceremonial deism in favor of the
current trend of Establishment Clause doctrine.  The Supreme
Court opinions in Newdow  indicate that, at least with respect to
three Justices, the Ninth Circuit’s assumption was incorrect.  But
the Ninth Circuit’s decision was wrong, in my opinion, because
the Establishment Clause should not be interpreted as requiring
elimination of every religious message or practice.  Demanding
inclusion merely inverts the classifications of judicial winners and
losers, but does little to promote the overall well-being of soci-
ety’s members.
In this Essay I have attempted to explain why the concept of
tolerance suggests that religious minorities should be permitted
to dissent from certain majoritarian practices such as the Pledge,
but not necessarily stop them altogether.  The alternative of ho-
mogenization, albeit under the label of secular neutrality, never
really works anyway.  In large part, one’s response to these ob-
servations will be determined by one’s predisposition toward a
particular point of view in church/state cases.  What I hope I have
proved is that religious minorities are vulnerable to persecution,
but that inclusion does little more to protect them than an ac-
commodationist approach.  That majorities have claims to emo-
tional harm that rival those of minorities, but a doctrine that
takes either into account is on shaky ground.  That diversity and
tolerance can be advanced by reference to inclusion, and that in-
clusion can just as easily dismantle these values.  That one’s idea
of what constitutes inclusion is itself a value choice, and that any
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doctrine based on inclusion is full of value-laden assumptions
about how people ought to behave.
Perhaps instead there is some middle ground between permit-
ting a practice which engenders feelings of exclusion within a re-
ligious minority and the total elimination of that practice.
Imagine a type of religious “Miranda” in which the government
attempts to disassociate itself from a particular practice or state-
ment that reflects the desires of the majority.  Immediately
before voluntary recitation of the Pledge, or perhaps before a
student commencement speaker takes the podium, or on a ban-
ner next to a public religious display, the following words could
be communicated:
The [county/city/state] of X respects the wishes and practices
of our citizens, and desires that no person or group is ostra-
cized, alienated, or coerced in any way.  Citizens and others
should feel free to dissent from this [exercise/display/message]
with the knowledge that your government protects your ac-
tions, and encourages others to respect them as well.
This is only a proposed and perhaps not even a good solution
to the problem.182  I hope that this Essay inspires others to think
of better ones.  In the end, an interpretation of the Establishment
Clause that invalidates certain policies or practices merely be-
cause they make non-adherents feel excluded appeals to our
highest antidiscrimination impulses, but does not do justice.
182 Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly , 465 U.S. 668, 713 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In the
absence of any other religious symbols or of any neutral disclaimer, the inescapable
effect of the cre`che will be to remind the average observer of the religious roots of
the celebration he is witnessing . . . .”). Compare  Capitol Square Review & Advi-
sory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 753, 769 (1995) (Scalia, J., plurality) (in the context of
a private religious message in a public forum, questioning the propriety of any iden-
tification or disclaimer as a “highly litigable feature”), with id.  at 775-83 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (in the same context, approving of a disclaimer as an effective means
of disassociating government from a religious message).
